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This Note analyzes the impact of the Convention on
Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC) in light of
the dual purposes of international agreements on civil liability for
nuclear damages, ensuring victim compensation for transnational
damages and safeguarding the long-term viability of the nuclear
power industry from liability for nuclear accidents by establishing
rules to control industry liability. Particular emphasis is placed on
the impact of the CSC on the two major users of nuclear power in the
CSC, the United States. and Japan. While there are valid concerns
about the provisions of all international agreements on nuclear
liability, including the CSC, this paper argues that the CSC effectively
controls industry liability but will likely prove to be of little impact
for domestic victims in either the United States. or Japan.
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INTRODUCTION

With Japan’s ratification of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA)-affiliated Convention on Supplementary
Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC) on January 15, 2015, the
CSC took effect on April 15, 2015, the newest international
agreement in the labyrinthine world of nuclear damage compensation
agreements.1 International agreements on civil liability for nuclear
damages, of which the CSC is one, are designed to ensure victim
compensation for transnational damages and safeguard the long-term
viability of the nuclear power industry from liability for nuclear
accidents by establishing rules to control industry liability. 2 This
paper analyzes the impact of the CSC in light of these two purposes,
with particular emphasis on the impact of the CSC on the two major
users of nuclear power in the CSC, the United States and Japan. The
main proponents of the CSC are national governments, who highlight
its ability to be a truly global treaty system, promote victim
compensation through provisions stronger than other treaties which
have taken effect, and control industry liability.3 Critics of the CSC
such as Prof. Currie and the Japan Federation of Bar Associations
assert that, while it provides better protection for victims that some
1

Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Sept. 29, 1997,
36 I.L.M. 1473 (entered into force Apr. 15, 2015), https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/
infcirc567.pdf [https://perma.cc/YNK2-D27Q] [hereinafter CSC]; Latest Status of the
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY [IAEA] (Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Conventions/supcomp_status.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8Z7-JFHK] [hereinafter CSC Latest
Status]; Japan Joins the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage,
INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY [IAEA] (Jan. 16, 2015), https://www.iaea.org/
newscenter/news/japan-joins-convention-supplementary-compensation-nuclear-damage
[https://perma.cc/4CAU-MYBK].
2 Julia Schwartz, International Nuclear Third Party Liability Law: The Response to
Chernobyl, in INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LAW IN THE POST-CHERNOBYL PERIOD,
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT NUCLEAR ENERGY
AGENCY [NEA], at 37, 39 (2006), https://www.oecd-nea.org/law/chernobyl/nea6146-iaeachernobyl.pdf [https://perma.cc/UK48-CUJU].
3 S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 109-15, at 1–2 (2006), https://www.congress.gov/109/crpt/erpt15/
CRPT-109erpt15.pdf [https://perma.cc/QPK5-QLLX]; Terabayashi Yūsuke (ሪ᷇㼅ӻ),
Genshiryoku Songai Hokanteki Hoshō Joyaku (CSC) Teiketsu ni tsuite (ᆀᨽᇣ㼌ᆼⲴ
㼌  ݏᶑ ㌴ (CSC) 㐐 ㎀ Ȁ ǹ Ǚ ǻ ) [Regarding Accession to the Convention on
Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC)], 361 RIPPŌ TO CHŌSA (・⌅ǽ
䃯ḫ) [LEGISLATION AND SURVEYS] 42, 53 (2015), http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/annai/
chousa/rippou_chousa/backnumber/2015pdf/20150202042.pdf [https://perma.cc/WWT723UQ] [hereinafter House of Councilors Report].
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other treaties, limits on damages, concentration of claims in the
country in which an accident occurs, short statutes of limitations, and
poor membership in the treaty systems mean that it is still deficient.4
While there are valid concerns about the provisions of all
international agreements on nuclear liability, including the CSC, this
paper argues that the CSC effectively controls industry liability but
will likely prove to be of little impact for domestic victims in either
the United States or Japan. The provisions of international
agreements which limit liability for nuclear damages by
concentrating liability on operators of nuclear reactors are favorable
to exporters of nuclear technology. However, the CSC also does not
substantially alter the compensation system for domestic accidents
for victims in the United States or Japan because it only establishes
minimum standards which national legislation can and does exceed
in both and United States and Japan and provides a relatively minor
amount of additional compensation. In addition, both states are less
likely to suffer transnational nuclear damages due to their
comparatively isolated geographical location as compared to
European states.
First this paper will examine the history of international
agreements on civil liability for nuclear damages, reviewing the terms
of the three treaty systems, the Paris Convention, the Vienna
Convention and the CSC and investigating the reasons that states join,
or do not join, these regimes. Second, this paper will describe the
U.S. system for the compensation of nuclear damage and the changes
made to it to implement the CSC. Third, this paper will do the same
for the Japanese nuclear damage compensation system. Fourth, this
paper will then show how the CSC protects the nuclear industry from
heavy liability but does little to expand victim protection. Lastly this

4 Duncan E. J. Currie, The Problems and Gaps in the Nuclear Liability Conventions
and an Analysis of How an Actual Claim Would Be Brought under the Current Existing
Treaty Regime in the Event of a Nuclear Accident, 35 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 85, 85
(2006); “Genshiryoku Songai no Baishō ni kansuru Hōritsu” oyobi “Genshiryoku Songai
no Hokanteki Hoshō ni kansuru Jōyaku” ni kansuru Ikensho (ǋᆀᨽᇣȃ䌐ݏȀ䯒Ǯ
Ƞ⌅ᖻǌ৺Ȉǋᆀᨽᇣȃ㼌ᆼⲴ㼌ݏȀ䯒ǮȠᶑ㌴ǌȀ䯒ǮȠ㾻ᴨ) [Opinion
on the “Act of Compensation for Nuclear Damage” and “Convention on Supplementary
Compensation for Nuclear Damage], NIHON BENGOSHI RENGŌKAI (ᰕᵜᔱ䆧༛䙓ਸՊ)
[JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS] (Aug. 22, 2014), at 1, http://www.nichibenren.or.
jp/library/ja/opinion/report/data/2014/opinion_140822_3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F2M4A5MF] [hereinafter August 2014 JFBA Opinion].
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paper will introduce the IAEA’s suggestions for improving the
current regime.

II.

PROVISIONS AND HISTORY

This section will introduce the provisions and history of the
CSC and the Conventions which proceeded it, the Paris Convention,
the Brussels Supplementary Compensation, and the Vienna
Convention, noting the current fragmented nature of the network of
international agreements and how this limits their utility. This section
will also show how the diverse interests of the parties caused this
fragmentation. A more focused analysis of how the terms of the CSC
accomplish the goals of international agreements on civil liability and
change the nuclear damage compensation systems of the United
States and Japan will be conducted later in this paper.
As previously mentioned, such international agreements are
designed to address the compensation of transnational damages.5 In
a world without international agreements addressing liability for
transnational nuclear damage, liability would be governed by the
domestic law of the nations involved. Most nations have laws that
remove liability for damage from nuclear power from the normal law
of tort and concentrate liability on the operator of the nuclear power
plant.6 At the outset of the nuclear age in the 1950s and 1960s, states
interested in promoting the peaceful use of atomic energy determined
that the ordinary rules of tort law would on one hand inhibit victims
from showing which parties were liable for their harm and on the
other expose nuclear operators, builders, and suppliers, etc., to
uninsurable liability. 7 As such, they established certain common
basic principles of liability for nuclear damages: (i) operators of
nuclear power plants should be exclusively liable for nuclear
damages, (ii) they should be strictly liable for nuclear damages, (iii)
their liability should be limited in amount, (iv) their liability must be
financially secured, for example through insurance, and (v) their
liability should be limited in time.8 The earliest example of this was

5
6
7
8

Schwartz, supra note 2, at 39.
Id.
Id.
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 39–41.
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the 1957 Price-Anderson Act in the United States.9 Japan passed its
Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage in 1963. 10 These two
pieces of legislation have similarities, but differ in several important
respects which will be discussed in detail later in this paper.
From these early days of the development of nuclear power
some nations, in particular the densely populated nations of Western
Europe with many neighboring states, have desired to address the
potential mess of conflicting laws that would govern a nuclear
accident that caused transnational damages by entering into
international agreements that delineate which state’s law will apply
to an accident as the rules on conflicts of laws differ between states.11
The core features of such agreements are that they (i) provide that the
law governing liability for nuclear damages is the law of the state in
which the nuclear accident occurred, (ii) provide for exclusive
jurisdiction over claims regarding liability for such accident in the
courts of the state in which the accident occurred, and (iii) require
that parties to the agreement bring their domestic law into
conformance with principles mentioned above, though the precise
requirements vary in important respects.12 Also, some international
agreements only cover nuclear damage suffered in states party to the
agreement in question.13
The first such agreement was the Paris Convention, open only
to OECD members or other states as allowed by a vote of the
members of the OECD, which was signed in 1960 and took effect in
1968.14 Membership of the Paris Convention focuses in Europe.15 It
9

Act to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (Price-Anderson), Pub. L. No. 85-256,
71 Stat. 576 (1957).
10 Genshiryoku Songai no Baishō ni kansuru Hōritsu (ᆀᨽᇣȃ䌐ݏȀ䯒ǮȠ⌅
ᖻ ) [Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage], Law No. 147 of 1961, http://law.egov.go.jp/htmldata/S36/S36HO147.html
[https://perma.cc/GX86-MWSJ]
(Japan)
[hereinafter ACND].
11 Schwartz, supra note 2, at 41.
12 Id. at 43.
13 Id.
14 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 1960,
956 U.N.T.S. 251 (entered into force Apr. 1, 1968), http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/
unts/volume%20956/volume-956-i-13706-english.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9T8R-TP3M]
[hereinafter Paris Convention].
15 Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability: Latest Status of Ratifications or
Accessions, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT NUCLEAR
ENERGY AGENCY [NEA] (July 30, 2015), https://www.oecd-nea.org/law/paris-conventionratification.html [https://perma.cc/9WF6-HX66] [hereinafter Paris Convention Latest
Status].
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was followed shortly thereafter by the Vienna Convention, an
agreement open to any state, which was signed in 1963 and took
effect in 1977. 16 Vienna Convention membership concentrates in
Latin America and the Middle East.17 The Paris Convention was also
strengthened by the Brussels Supplementary Convention, which
created the first framework for a supplementary compensation fund
consisting of contributions from state parties in the event of nuclear
damage in excess of the minimum amount of liability an operator
would be subject to under the Paris Convention. 18 However, the
United States was unable to join either Convention without
significant amendments to U.S. law because of several differences
between U.S. law and the requirements for entry to the two
Conventions.19
These agreements are still the bedrock of the international
regime for the compensation for transnational nuclear damages and a
brief review of their core terms is necessary in understanding the role
of the CSC. 20 Both treaties are only applicable only within the
territory of the contracting parties.21 Jurisdiction over claims arising
under the Conventions lies only with the courts of the contracting
party in which the nuclear incident occurred.22 Judgments entered by
the competent court generally must be recognized and enforced by all
16

Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 1063
U.N.T.S. 265, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc500.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9L9D-9LM9] (entered into force Nov. 12, 1977) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
17 Latest Status of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, INT’L
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY [IAEA] (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Conventions/liability_status.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RGV-RCDB] [hereinafter
Vienna Convention Latest Status].
18 Convention of 31st January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29th July
1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Jan. 31, 1963, 1041 U.N.T.S.
358 (entered into force Dec. 4, 1974), http://www.nea.fr/html/law/nlbrussels.html
[https://perma.cc/A7Y2-WQC2] [hereinafter Brussels Supplementary Convention].
19 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT 25
(1999), https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/gcprod/documents/paa-rep.pdf [https://perma.cc/
B5H3-LQ58] [hereinafter 1999 DOE Report].
20 The Paris Convention has sixteen parties with a total of 116 of the world’s 443
civilian nuclear power plants. The Vienna Convention has forty parties with a total of
seventy-six civilian nuclear power plants. Paris Convention Latest Status, supra note 15;
Vienna Convention Latest Status, supra note 17; Operational Reactors by Country, INT’L
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY [IAEA] (Feb. 14, 2016), https://www.iaea.org/PRIS/
WorldStatistics/OperationalReactorsByCountry.aspx [https://perma.cc/ENE3-AME8].
21 Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 2; Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 11.
22 Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 13(a); Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art.
11.
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contracting parties. 23 The Convention and national law must be
applied without discrimination based on nationality, domicile or
residence. 24 The Conventions define operator liability for nuclear
damages as being for damage to or loss of life of any person and
damage to or loss of property which is caused by a nuclear incident,
except the operator’s property at the site of the nuclear installation.25
Both Conventions provide for the strict and exclusive of liability of
nuclear operators for nuclear damages where causation can be proved,
with exceptions only for damage caused by nuclear incidents relating
to acts of war or insurrection or, unless national legislation of the
installation states otherwise, a grave natural disaster of an exceptional
character. 26 The Paris Convention provides that states may limit
liability to not less than 5 million Special Drawing Rights (SDR) with
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) but not more than 15 million
SDR, and the Vienna Convention provides that states may limit
liability to not less than U.S. $5 million.27 Financial security must be
provided by the nuclear operator in such amount.28 The statute of
limitations on claims for compensation is generally 10 years from the
date of the incident, unless national law of a contracting party
provides for insurance coverage for a longer period.29 The law of the
competent court may provide for a statute of limitations of not less
than three years from the date the victim had or should have had
knowledge of the damage and the identity of the operator liable for
the damage under the Paris Convention, and not less than two years

23

Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 13(d); Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art.

24

Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 14(a); Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art.

25

Paris Convention, supra note 14, arts. 1, 4; Vienna Convention, supra note 16, arts.

12.
13.
1(j), 2.
26

Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 4; Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art 2.
Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 7; Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 5.
Regarding SDR, see Rule O—Valuation of the SDR, Valuation of Currencies in Terms of the
SDR, Freely Usable Currency, and Operational Budget, INT’L MONETARY FUND,
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bl/rr15.htm [https://perma.cc/YRJ6-Q5DC] (last
visited Jan. 15, 2017). One SDR is equal to approximately U.S. $1.35, as of January 2017.
SDR Valuation, INT’L MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/rms_
sdrv.aspx [https://perma.cc/4NZ4-R8RG] (last visited Jan. 15, 2017, 2016).
28 Paris Convention, supra note 14, arts. 10(a), 15; Vienna Convention, supra note 16,
art. 7.
29 Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 8(a); Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 6.
27
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under the Vienna Convention.30 Nuclear operators have a right of
recourse against third parties only where explicitly provided for by
written agreement or where the accident was caused by the intentional
act of an individual.31
The Brussels Supplementary Convention, which limits
membership to states also party to the Paris Convention, provides for
two additional tiers of government funds for compensation beyond
the first tier of compensation required in the Paris Convention in the
event of an accident.32 The second tier is composed of public funds
provided by the installation state in which an accident occurred in the
amount of the difference between 175 million SDR and the minimum
liability amount established by the installation state.33 The third tier
is a fund of 125 million SDR provided by all contracting parties
according to a pre-determined formula.34
Chernobyl brought home the need for such agreements. The
1986 Chernobyl accident caused massive transnational nuclear
damages, but it took place in the USSR, which was not party to any
international agreement, had no special legislation on nuclear
damages, and asserted it that it had no duty to provide compensation
under international law. 35 While damages from Chernobyl were
incurred as far away as the United States and Japan, the European
states suffered the most damage and in the aftermath of the accident
they moved to both expand the number of states party to international
agreements and to make it easier for victims to recover for nuclear
damages under the existing agreements.36
One of the first measures was the ratification of the 1988 Joint
Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and
the Paris Convention, which grants coverage to a state party to it
under the convention to which it is not already a party (either the Paris
or Vienna Convention) and ensures that only one of either the Paris
Convention or Vienna Convention will apply to a nuclear incident.37
30

Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 8(c); Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art.

6(c).
31

Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 6(f); Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 10.
Brussels Supplementary Convention, supra note 18, art. 3(a).
33
Brussels Supplementary Convention, supra note 18, art. 3(b).
34 Brussels Supplementary Convention, supra note 18, art. 3(b).
35 Schwartz, supra note 2, at 37–38.
36 Id. at 43–44.
37 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris
Convention, Sept. 21, 1988, 1672 U.N.T.S. 293 (entered into force Apr. 27, 1992),
32
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Subsequently, proposals would be made to amend the Paris
Convention, Vienna Convention, and Brussels Supplementary
Convention in response to criticism that limits on liability under
existing agreements were too low, that an additional compensation
fund was necessary to cover damages in excess of operator liability,
that existing statutes of limitations were too short, that additional
types of damages must be covered, and that territorial scope should
be widened.38
Also, the United States was interested in joining an
international regime covering liability for transnational nuclear
damage but was unable to join either the Paris or Vienna Convention
as U.S. law channels operator liability differently than the
Conventions do and U.S. limits on liability are considerably higher
than in either Convention. 39 In the opinion of the Department of
Energy, joining the CSC was meant to address concerns about
ensuring compensation for nuclear accidents that occurred outside the
United States and also promote commercial opportunities for U.S.
firms to assist in the development of the safe use of nuclear power in
developing states by providing them with the same rules channeling
liability as firms from competing European states and Russia which
were parties to the Paris and Vienna Conventions. 40 Other states
recognized that there would need to be a grandfather clause allowing
the United States to join the CSC, a major goal if the agreement were
to have global acceptance since the United States is the largest user

http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201672/v1672.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9NQB-CURE] [hereinafter Joint Protocol]. See generally Schwartz, supra note 2, at 45.
38 Protocol to Amend the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear
Energy of 29 July 1960, as amended by the Additional Protocols of 28 January 1964 and by
the Protocol of 16 November 1982, Feb. 12, 2004, http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/parisconvention-protocol.html [https://perma.cc/J87W-45WE] (has not entered force)
[hereinafter 2004 Protocol to Amend Paris Convention]; Protocol to Amend the Convention
of 31 January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party
Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28
January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16 November 1982, Feb. 12, 2004 [hereinafter 2004
Protocol to Amend Brussels Supplementary Convention], http://www.oecd-nea.org/
law/brussels_supplementary_convention.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HLS-YDTN] (has not
entered force); Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear
Damage, Sept. 29, 1997, 2241 U.N.T.S. 302 (entered into force Oct. 4, 2003),
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%202241/v2241.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V653-E4KT] [hereinafter 1997 Revised Vienna Convention]; Currie, supra note 4, at 107.
39 1999 DOE Report, supra note 19, at 25.
40 Id.
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of nuclear power.41 This was uncontroversial and the United States
would play a critical role in the negotiations, preparing what would
be the basis for the ultimate text of the CSC.42
Despite a general consensus about the need for a more
globally accepted regime with stronger victim protection provisions,
amending the Conventions was a messy and drawn out process due
to the conflicting interests of the parties. As the Paris Convention
was not designed to be open to non-OECD members, the IAEAaffiliated Vienna Convention was addressed first, with the CSC, also
developed under the aegis of the IAEA, being negotiated
simultaneously and with the intent that it both complement the
Vienna Convention in the manner the Brussels Supplementary
Convention complements the Paris Convention and act as a more
broadly applicable third treaty regime.43 The terms of the agreements
are designed to be as similar as possible to promote the adoption of
both. Negotiations began on these two agreements in 1990.44
The Explanatory Texts to the Revised Vienna Convention and
the CSC point out several areas of conflict during negotiations. The
parties were not in agreement on the new, expanded definition of
damages, largely as a result of different treatments in national law of
economic losses and environmental damages. 45 Also, while there
was general agreement that the limits on compensation should be
increased in the Vienna Convention and CSC, the amount the limits
should be increased was so controversial it was left until the final
stage of negotiations and eventually phase-in periods with reduced
minimum liability amounts were adopted.46 Furthermore, one group
of countries wanted to expand the geographical scope of coverage of
damage to damage wherever suffered, not just the territory of the
parties to the Convention, but this was controversial as it was seen to
reduce the amount of compensation available for victims in the
parties to the Convention, though it is also precisely the problem that
Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], The 1997 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability
for Nuclear Damage and the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear
Damage—Explanatory Texts, at 64–65, IAEA Doc. STI/PUB/1279 (2007), http://wwwpub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1279_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PAM-T4W9]
[hereinafter Vienna Convention/CSC Explanatory Texts].
42 Id. at 65.
43 Schwartz, supra note 2, at 46.
44 Vienna Convention/CSC Explanatory Texts, supra note 41, at 34.
45 Id. at 34.
46 Id. at 43, 77.
41
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arose in the Chernobyl accident. 47 Lastly, the terms of the
supplementary compensation fund in the CSC were the most heavily
debated provision.48 Originally the idea of a supplementary tier of
compensation to which all parties would be required to contribute was
rejected in the 1963 Vienna Convention because it was thought that
such a provision would not be widely accepted since the primary
beneficiaries of the fund would be victims in the state in which an
accident took place. 49 Nuclear states, in particular the U.K. and
France, objected to the reservation of funds in the supplementary fund
for transnational damages because it violated the principle of nondiscrimination in the distribution of damages and was perceived as
being unconstitutional in some states. 50 Furthermore, non-nuclear
states, namely New Zealand, objected to being required to make
contributions to the supplementary fund as any nuclear accident could
not be their fault.51
A protocol to amend the Vienna Convention and the draft of
the CSC were agreed in 1997.52 The Vienna Convention was the first
of the original Conventions for which an amendment was proposed,
and is the only one for which the amendment has taken effect.53 The
minimum liability amount for nuclear operators was increased from
U.S. $ 5 million to 300 million SDR.54 The statute of limitations for
compensation claims for loss of life or personal injury was extended
to 30 years and priority is given to such claims in the distribution of
compensation where claims are brought within 10 years.55 The scope
of compensable damages was expanded to cover a variety of
additional environmental and economic damages, using the same
47

Id. at 29.
Id. at 19, 63.
49 Id. at 63.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 79.
52 Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage,
Sept. 29, 1997, 2241 U.N.T.S. 302 (entered into force Oct. 4, 2003), https://www.iaea.org/
sites/default/files/infcirc566.pdf [https://perma.cc/YR8E-8XHX] [hereinafter 1997 Revised
Vienna Protocol].
53 Vienna Convention Latest Status, supra note 17; Latest Status of the Protocol to
Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, INT’L ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY [IAEA] (Nov. 26, 2015), https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Conventions/protamend_status.pdf [https://perma.cc/WF7V-EBMT] [hereinafter Revised
Vienna Convention Latest Status].
54 1997 Revised Vienna Protocol, supra note 52, art. 7.
55 1997 Revised Vienna Protocol, supra note 52, art. 8.
48
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definition as the CSC (detailed below).56 The territorial scope of the
Vienna Convention was extended to nuclear damage wherever
suffered, though contracting parties may exclude damage suffered in
non-contracting parties and their territorial waters by national
legislation if such non-contracting party does not provide equivalent
reciprocal benefits.57 Also, the exception to liability for grave natural
disasters was removed.58
As discussed above, the CSC is designed to both be a third
nuclear damage liability regime open to states not party to either the
Paris or Vienna Conventions as long as their national law met basic
criteria and also serve as the equivalent of the Brussels
Supplementary Convention for the parties of the Vienna
Convention. 59 The CSC provides for a minimum national
compensation amount of at least 300 million SDR and a
supplementary compensation fund of about 300 million SDR
contributed by the parties to the CSC which is to be drawn on by the
installation state in which an accident occurred to compensate victims
of a nuclear incident in the event that the first tier funds are
exhausted.60 Contributions to the supplementary fund are based about
90% on the nuclear power generating capacity of each party with the
remainder based on the UN assessment of each party.61
The CSC defines nuclear damages to include (a) loss of life
or personal injury, (b) loss of or damage to property.62 The following
are also included to the extent determined by the law of the competent
court: (i) economic loss arising from the above (a) or (b), (ii)
environmental reinstatement costs that are actually incurred or will
be incurred, (iii) loss of income incurred as a result of a significant
impairment of the environment, (iv) preventative measures, and (v)

56

1997 Revised Vienna Protocol, supra note 52, art. 2. This definition is the same as
that used in the CSC and will be discussed in further detail in the analysis of the provisions
of the CSC.
57 1997 Revised Vienna Protocol, supra note 52, art. 3.
58 1997 Revised Vienna Protocol, supra note 52, art. 6.
59 CSC, supra note 1, art. 2; Japan Joins the Convention on Supplementary
Compensation for Nuclear Damage, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY [IAEA] (Jan. 16, 2015),
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/japan-joins-convention-supplementarycompensation-nuclear-damage [https://perma.cc/4CAU-MYBK].
60 CSC, supra note 1, arts. 3, 4.
61 CSC, supra note 1, art. 4(1)(a).
62 CSC, supra note 1, art. 1(f)(i–ii).
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any other economic loss permitted by the law of civil liability of the
competent court.63
Exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought under the CSC
generally belongs to the courts of the party within whose territory or
waters the incident occurs, with certain narrow exceptions. 64
Compensation must be distributed equitably without discrimination
on the basis of nationality, domicile or residence, though states may
exclude nuclear damage suffered in a non-Contracting State subject
to the limitations of other Conventions.65 Regarding compensation
from the international supplementary compensation fund,
compensation will only be provided for damage suffered in the
territory of a party or other area with one of several possible sufficient
connections to that state, such as its EEZ.66 50% of the compensation
provided through the international supplementary compensation fund
is prioritized for damage suffered outside of the territory of the
installation state unless the state provides for not less than 600 million
SDR of compensation under national law.67
Parties to the CSC which are not also parties to either the Paris
Convention or Vienna Convention must have national law consistent
with the following principles, which are based on the Paris and
Vienna Conventions.68 Liability for nuclear damage must be strictly
and exclusively concentrated on the operator of the nuclear reactor
which caused nuclear damage.69 There are exceptions to operator
liability for nuclear damage directly due to an act of war or
insurrection or, except where the law of the installation state provides
otherwise, directly due to a grave natural disaster of an exceptional
character. 70 Operator liability may be limited to as little as 300
million SDR and operators must maintain financial security in such
amount.71 If a state does not limit operator liability, then the amount
of financial security may not be less than 300 million SDR.72 The
period of extinction for claims under the CSC is generally 10 years,
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

CSC, supra note 1, art. 1(f)(iii–vii).
CSC, supra note 1, art. 13(1).
CSC, supra note 1, art. 3(2)(a)
CSC, supra note 1, art. 5.
CSC, supra note 1, art. 11.
CSC, supra note 1, art. 2(1).
CSC, supra note 1, Annex art. 3.
CSC, supra note 1, Annex art. 3(5).
CSC, supra note 1, Annex art. 4–5.
CSC, supra note 1, Annex art. 5.
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however if under national law the liability of the operator is covered
by insurance or other financial security or by State funds for a period
longer than ten years this period may be extended up to the period for
which the operator’s liability is covered.73 The law of the competent
court may establish a period of prescription or extinction of not less
than three years from the date a person suffering nuclear damage had
knowledge of the damage and the operator liable for the damage.74
The right of recourse of the operator against a third party is limited to
cases where this is expressly provided for by written agreement or
intentional acts or omissions by an individual.75
In 2004 the parties to the Paris Convention and the Brussels
Supplementary Convention agreed on protocols to amend both
Conventions.76 These Protocols met with a decidedly unenthusiastic
response and have not been ratified, but their proposed amendments
are of value in analyzing the CSC as they provide for more
compensation, but make it available to fewer victims and for fewer
types of damages. 77 The minimum liability amount in the Paris
Convention was raised, generally, to € 700 million from the previous
maximum of 15 million SDR, and the exception to liability for grave
natural disasters of an exceptional character was removed. 78 The
territorial scope of the Paris Convention was extended to include
nuclear damage wherever suffered, though contracting parties may
exclude with national legislation damage suffered in non-contracting
parties if such non-contracting party does not provide equivalent
reciprocal benefits. 79 The Protocol added a definition of damages
that is largely the same as that of the 1997 Revised Vienna Protocol,
though it can be read to be somewhat more restrictive of economic
loss.80 The statute of limitations on compensation claims for loss of
73

CSC, supra note 1, Annex art. 9(1).
CSC, supra note 1, Annex art. 9(3).
75 CSC, supra note 1, Annex art. 10.
76 2004 Protocol to Amend Paris Convention, supra note 38; 2004 Protocol to Amend
Brussels Supplementary Convention, supra note 38.
77 Paris Convention Latest Status, supra note 15; Brussels Supplementary Convention:
Latest Status of Ratifications or Accessions, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY [NEA] (Mar. 18, 2014), https://www.oecdnea.org/law/brussels-convention-ratification.html
[https://perma.cc/6B7L-F3H5]
[hereinafter Brussels Supplementary Convention Latest Status].
78 2004 Protocol to Amend Paris Convention, supra note 38, art. 1(H, J).
79 2004 Protocol to Amend Paris Convention, supra note 38, art. 1(C).
80 2004 Protocol to Amend Paris Convention, supra note 38, art. 1(B); Schwartz, supra
note 2, at 54–55.
74
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life or personal injury was extended to 30 years.81 The Protocol to
Amend the Brussels Supplementary Convention increased the second
tier of damages (provided by the installation state) from 175 million
SDR to € 500 million, and the third tier (provided by all contracting
parties) from 125 million SDR to € 300 million. 82 Unlike the
Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention, in the Protocol to Amend
the Brussels Supplementary Convention the territorial scope of
damages covered is expanded only to cover the exclusive economic
zone and continental shelf of contracting parties, not damages
wherever suffered.83 This is because the compensation provided in
the second and third tiers is provided by public funds and the parties
didn’t want to make it so widely available.84
Of the Revised Paris and Vienna Conventions, only the
Revised Vienna Convention was actually ratified, and only by 13
parties as comparted to the 40 parties of the original Vienna
Convention. 85 The reaction to the CSC was likewise less than
enthusiastic. Only 13 states signed the CSC shortly after its
publication, and only Argentina, Morocco, and Romania actually
ratified the CSC shortly after signing it.86 Many signatories never
ratified it, or took many years to ratify it, like the United States.87
This meant that initially the CSC could not take effect, as it required
ratification by at least five states with a combined 400,000 megawatts
(MW) of installed nuclear power generating capacity.88
While the United States played a key role in the drafting of
the CSC, it took until 2008 for the CSC to be ratified by the United
States. 89 Part of the initial delay was because the CSC requires
membership in the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which the United
States was not a party to at the time the CSC opened for signature,

81

2004 Protocol to Amend Paris Convention, supra note 38, art. 1(I).
2004 Protocol to Amend Brussels Supplementary Convention, supra note 38, art. 3.
83 2004 Protocol to Amend Brussels Supplementary Convention, supra note 38, art. 2.
84 Schwartz, supra note 2, at 55.
85 Vienna Convention Latest Status, supra note 17; Revised Vienna Convention Latest
Status, supra note 53; Paris Convention Latest Status, supra note 15; Brussels
Supplementary Convention Latest Status, supra note 77.
86 CSC Latest Status, supra note 1.
87 Id.
88 CSC, supra note 1, art. 20.
89 CSC Latest Status, supra note 1.
82

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017

2016]

IMPACT OF THE CSC

327

but ratified in 1999. 90 The CSC was eventually presented by
President Bush to the Senate for ratification in 2002.91 Committee
hearings began in 2005 and the CSC received the advice and consent
of the Senate in 2006.92 The Senate noted that the CSC would ensure
“prompt and adequate compensation” to victims of nuclear disasters
and address the civil liability faced by U.S. exporters of nuclear
technology. 93 In ratifying the CSC, the United States emphasized
that the CSC was consistent with the Price-Anderson Act and it
balanced victim compensation with industry liability risks. 94 Of
particular importance was the fact the CSC had the potential for
global acceptance.95
However the CSC was caught up in the process of amending
energy law more generally, with a piece of omnibus legislation that
included the implementing legislation for the CSC being hotly
debated by both Houses of Congress and the Bush Administration, in
particular over provisions relating to climate change and oil industry
subsidies. 96 The result of this was that the Senate passed
implementing legislation for the CSC several times, but the House of
Representatives rejected these bills until it passed an omnibus energy
bill called the Energy Independence and Security Act in 2007.97
Debate over the CSC in the United States was framed in the
context of a push by the Bush Administration to expand the use of
nuclear power in the United States and abroad as a clean power
source. 98 U.S. construction of nuclear power plants slowed
dramatically after the 1970s as no new plants were ordered between
1973 and 2012, though the NRC now has 12 applications for licenses
90
CSC, supra note 1, art. 18; Latest Status of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, INT’L
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY [IAEA] (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Conventions/nuclearsafety_status.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3CU-WNEM].
91 Senate Consideration of Treaty Document 107-21, U.S. CONG., https://www.
congress.gov/treaty-document/107th-congress/21 [https://perma.cc/E3NG-P7AS] (last
visited Jan. 15, 2017).
92 Id.
93 S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 109-15, supra note 3, at 1–2.
94 Id. at 2.
95 Id.
96 FRED SISSINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34294, ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND
SECURITY ACT OF 2007: A SUMMARY OF MAJOR PROVISIONS 1–2 (2007).
97 Nuclear Regulation Committee, Report of the Nuclear Regulation Committee, 29
ENERGY L. J. 789 (2008).
98 Solution to Greenhouse Gases Is New Nuclear Plants, Bush Says, N.Y. TIMES (May
25, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/25/washington/25bush.html [https://perma.cc/
7Q6M-JJK6].
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to operate nuclear power plants. 99 The nuclear industry has also
become much more globalized, with operator and supplier networks
for U.S. nuclear plants no longer controlled by U.S. firms, with
substantial cooperation between U.S. and Japanese firms. 100
However, the level of U.S. exports of nuclear plant components,
equipment, fuel, and technology had held steady since the mid-1990s,
but U.S. market share has fallen significantly.101 Nevertheless, the
21st Century has seen a rise in countries both large and small express
interest in developing nuclear power plants.102 U.S. nuclear supplier
Westinghouse had plans for 14 new nuclear reactors in China alone
in the early 2000s and China had proposals for up to 80 more.103 In
addition, India had plans for 12 plants.104
Japan did not sign the CSC in 1997. 105 Initially, Japan
considered the CSC unattractive because Japanese law was seen as
providing a higher level of protection of victims, the Japanese
government did not consider it likely that Japan would be involved in
a nuclear accident with transnational effects, and none of Japan’s
neighbors were party to any of the Conventions.106
Japan’s interest in the CSC reemerged in the aftermath of the
2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, culminating in Japan’s ratification
of the CSC in 2015.107 With Japan’s ratification, the parties that had
ratified the CSC collectively possessed over 400,000 MW of installed
nuclear capacity and the CSC took effect in April 2015.108 According
to a report produced by the House of Councilors, Japan’s change in
position was due to a revaluation of the risks of nuclear power and
renewed interest in providing legal predictability for the nuclear
industry. 109 This report also emphasized that ratifying the CSC
99

PAUL K. KERR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MARY BETH K. NIKITIN & MARK HOLT,
R41910, NUCLEAR ENERGY COOPERATION WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS
7–8 (2014).
100 Id. at 8.
101 Id. at 6.
102 Id. at 3.
103 Id. at 20.
104 Id.
105 CSC Latest Status, supra note 1.
106
House of Councilors Report, supra note 3, at 52–53.
107 Id.
108 CSC Latest Status, supra note 1; Operational Reactors by Country, INT’L ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY [IAEA] (Feb. 14, 2016), https://www.iaea.org/PRIS/WorldStatistics/
OperationalReactorsByCountry.aspx [https://perma.cc/ENE3-AME8].
109 House of Councilors Report, supra note 3, at 52–53.
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would make it easier for the United States to provide assistance in the
clean-up efforts at the Fukushima Daiichi reactor by assuaging the
concerns about liability of U.S. firms. 110 The report also put
particular emphasis on a belief that the modest terms of the CSC
would help promote its adoption by the developing states of Asia that
were endeavoring to launch a nuclear power industry.111 Indeed the
IAEA notes that 60 countries are considering constructing nuclear
power plants, and the IAEA forecasts that 10 to 24 countries will
bring plants online by 2030. 112 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MOFA) phrased Japan’s reasons for adopting slightly differently.113
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) advocated joining the CSC
because it would enable a contribution to building an international
compensation system for nuclear damages, improve compensation in
the event of a nuclear accident, ensure swift and fair aid to victims,
and improve in legal predictability by enacting international rules and
improve the environment for related industries.114 MOFA has also
emphasized the fact that the CSC is more compatible with the ACND,
for example as regards definitions of damages and exceptions to
liability, and that membership in the Paris and Vienna Conventions
was concentrated in regions nowhere near Japan.115 Prof. Takashima
suggests several additional reasons for Japan’s shift in position: the
nuclear renaissance in Asia, the restructuring in the nuclear industry
through acquisitions and collaboration in which Japanese industry
has taken part, and the fact that the United States, with which the
Japanese nuclear industry has close ties, joined the CSC system and
was attempting to bring it into effect.116 There was also supposition
110

Id.
Id.
112
Yukiya Amano, Statement to Nuclear Power Forum, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
[IAEA] (Dec. 10, 2010), https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/statement-nuclearpower-forum [https://perma.cc/24FQ-F45U].
113 Genshiryoku Songai no Hokantekina Hoshō ni kansuru Jōyaku no Gaiyō (ᆀᨽ
ᇣȃ㼌ᆼⲴǿ㼌ݏȀ䯒ǮȠᶑ㌴ȃᾲ㾱) [Outline of the Convention on Supplementary
Compensation for Nuclear Damage], JAPAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Jan. 15, 2015),
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000057321.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4D7-HSNT].
114 Id.
115 Id.
116
Takashima Tadayoshi (儈ጦᘐ㗙), Fukushima Dai’ichi Genpatsu Jiko to Kokusai
Hō (⾿ጦㅜаⲪһ᭵ǽഭ䳋⌅) [The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant Accident and
International Law], in SHINSAI GENPATSU JIKO TO KANKYŌ HŌ (䴷⚭࣭Ⲫһ᭵ǽ⫠ຳ
⌅  [EARTHQUAKES, NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW] 236 (Shigeru
Takahashi & Tadashi Otsuka eds. 2013), http://webcatplus.nii.ac.jp/webcatplus/details/
book/25710935.html [https://perma.cc/5Y98-9MJ5].
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in the press that U.S. and Japanese firms were trying to compensate
for declines in domestic performance with exports to developing
countries.117
Given the numerous, fundamental disagreements on the terms
of the Revised Vienna Convention and the CSC even between the
negotiating parties, it is unsurprising that ratification has not
proceeded smoothly. Nevertheless, the difficulty in gathering
significant membership in any single treaty regime limits the utility
of all of the treaties, including the CSC.118 As mentioned previously,
states have long looked for a mechanism to clarify what law will
apply when there are transnational damages from a nuclear accident
and to ensure that their citizens obtain compensation for those
damages.119 If there are insufficient parties to the Conventions then
these objectives cannot be achieved, as was realized after the
Chernobyl accident. 120 Indeed with membership fragmented
between multiple conventions this problem largely remains.
At present the membership in the Conventions is as follows.
There are nine parties to the CSC, sixteen parties to the Paris
Convention, and forty parties to the Vienna Convention (only 13
ratified the Revised Vienna Convention). 121 However the United
States (99 reactors), Japan (43 reactors, many inactive pending
approval), and India (22 reactors), all with substantial nuclear power
industries, are party to the CSC.122 In total the parties to the CSC
operate 169 reactors, the parties to the Paris Convention 116 reactors,
and the parties to the Vienna Convention 76 reactors.123 Of the major
nuclear powers, Canada, China (including Taiwan), South Korea, and

117 Fukushima Fires up Atomic Industry’s Removal-of-Liability Drive, BLOOMBERG BUS.
(June 13, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-12/japan-may-ratifyatomic-treaty-for-u-s-aid-in-fukushima-cleanup [https://perma.cc/CX6A-EDE5].
118 Schwartz, supra note 2, at 50–51.
119 Id. at 41.
120 Id. at 43–44.
121 CSC Latest Status, supra note 1; Paris Convention Latest Status, supra note 15;
Vienna Convention Latest Status, supra note 17.
122
CSC Latest Status, supra note 1; Operational Reactors by Country, INT’L ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY [IAEA] (Feb. 14, 2016), https://www.iaea.org/PRIS/WorldStatistics/
OperationalReactorsByCountry.aspx [https://perma.cc/ENE3-AME8].
123 Operational Reactors by Country, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY [IAEA] (Feb. 14,
2016),
https://www.iaea.org/PRIS/WorldStatistics/OperationalReactorsByCountry.aspx
[https://perma.cc/ENE3-AME8].
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Switzerland are not party to any Convention, and they collectively
operate 92 reactors.124
It is therefore important to examine the reasons why
membership in the Conventions has not grown. One reason for
failure of nuclear power generating countries to join the CSC was
preferential treatment of plaintiffs from outside a state’s borders in
distributions from the supplementary compensation fund. 125 This
was one of the matters of dispute during the negotiation process.126
In addition, nuclear states objected to reserving half of the
supplementary fund for transnational damages which may have
occurred in states not party to the CSC.127 The drafting process also
revealed disagreement on the proper scope of compensable
damages. 128 There also was disagreement over whether to cover
damages wherever suffered, as the Vienna Convention does, or only
in the parties to the Convention, as the CSC does.129 Furthermore,
the parties to the Brussels Supplementary Convention, including
France and the U.K., felt it would be too complex and duplicative to
be part of both systems considering the different provisions of the
agreements.130 Russian representatives have voiced concern that the
presence of the CSC as a third legal regime to excessively fragment
the legal framework. 131 Furthermore, the increased minimum
liability amounts have encountered stiff resistance among the
European states, and they were not even able to get sufficient
ratification of the amended Paris Convention. 132 For non-nuclear
states, such as Austria and New Zealand, the provisions concentrating
liability on nuclear operators and relieving suppliers of liability have
precluded their ratification of any international agreement on this
subject as they see such provisions as being overly protective of the
nuclear industry.133 Furthermore, Europe is generally turning away
124

Schwartz, supra note 2, at 57.
Id. at 52.
126 Vienna Convention/CSC Explanatory Texts, supra note 41, at 63.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 34.
129 Id. at 29.
130
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 52.
131 Looking at Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, LAW360 (Dec. 4,
2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/600893/looking-at-supplementary-compensationfor-nuclear-damage [https://perma.cc/AZW6-EZG7].
132 Schwartz, supra note 2, at 43, 77.
133 Id. at 59.
125
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from nuclear power. Germany has decided to phase out nuclear
power.134 Italian voters rejected a bid by the government to revive
nuclear power generation after a moratorium on new plants was put
in place in the 1980s.135
However there has been a new wave of interest in the modern
agreements on the part of states interested in building a domestic
nuclear power industry, with 4 states (including Japan) ratifying the
CSC and 8 states ratifying the Revised Vienna Convention since
2010.136 Many U.S. companies will only agree to export to parties to
the CSC.137 The U.A.E., for example, acceded to the Revised Vienna
Convention in 2012, 138 and the CSC in 2014, 139 after signing a
contract for four nuclear reactors, notably with a South Korean firm
not a U.S. firm, highlighting the role of the CSC as a part of the
U.A.E’s commitment to the safe development of nuclear power.140
In addition, India, keen to expand its use of nuclear power to meet its
surging electricity demand, ratified the CSC in February 2016. 141
Negotiations had gone on for over 10 years with U.S. firms balking
at Indian law which held suppliers liable for damages due to
manufacturing defects and refusing to export to India unless India
ratified the CSC. 142 While membership in the Conventions is
expanding somewhat, it is still far from the ideal of a global regime
imagined in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident.

134
Goodbye Nuclear Power: Germany’s Renewable Energy Revolution, GUARDIAN
(May 10, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/nuclear-power-germany
-renewable-energy [https://perma.cc/G47D-XE63].
135 Italy Says No, WORLD NUCLEAR NEWS (June 14, 2011), http://www.world-nuclearnews.org/NP_Italy_says_no_1406111.html [https://perma.cc/M6DJ-3H4T].
136 CSC Latest Status, supra note 1; Revised Vienna Convention Latest Status, supra
note 77.
137 KERR, NIKITIN & HOLT, supra note 99, at 22.
138 Revised Vienna Convention Latest Status, supra note 77.
139 CSC Latest Status, supra note 1.
140 UAE Signs International Nuclear Liability Pact, WORLD NUCLEAR INSTITUTE (July
10, 2014), http://www.nei.org/News-Media/News/News-Archives/UAE-Signs-Internation
al-Nuclear-Liability-Pact [https://perma.cc/2TRL-8F8S].
141 India’s Nuclear Ambitions Boosted with Global Liability Pact, BLOOMBERG NEWS
(Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-05/india-s-nuclear-ambi
tions-boosted-by-joining-liability-pact [https://perma.cc/TJS8-MATZ].
142 Id.; KERR, NIKITIN & HOLT, supra note 99, at 20.
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U.S. NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION SYSTEM

Before analyzing how well the CSC accomplishes its twin
goals of promoting victim compensation and shielding operators
from unbearable liability for accidents, a background in U.S. and
Japanese law on the compensation of nuclear damage is necessary as
these are the two main population centers in the CSC when it took
effect. In the United States, liability for nuclear damage is governed
by the 1957 Price-Anderson Act (1957), which has been amended
about every ten years since its passage and undergone significant
changes since its passage.143
The Price-Anderson Act defines the liability of anyone liable
for “public liability,” which is defined as “any legal liability arising
out of or resulting from a nuclear incident or precautionary
evacuation.”144 This definition means that, in addition to the nuclear
operator, other parties, such as suppliers, are still liable for nuclear
damage, but the liability is channeled to the operator because these
other parties are indemnified by the nuclear operator under his
insurance coverage. 145 This is termed economic channeling, in
contrast to the international standard of legal channeling discussed
previously, in which the nuclear operator is deemed solely liable for
all damages and nuclear damage is removed by statute from normal
tort law.146
Under the Price-Anderson Act, unless there is an
“extraordinary nuclear occurrence” (ENO), nuclear operators are
subject to the ordinary standards of liability.147 Unless the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) determines that there was an ENO,
plaintiffs generally need to show that the damage caused to them was
due to negligence or some other wrongful act unless state law

143 Act to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (Price-Anderson), Pub. L. No. 85-256,
71 Stat. 576 (1957); Pub. L. No. 89-645, 80 Stat. 891 (1966); Pub. L. No. 94-197, 89 Stat.
1111 (1975); Pub. L. No. 100-408, 102 Stat. 1066 (1988); Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 779
(2005); Michael Faure & Tom Vanden Borre, Compensating Nuclear Damage: A
Comparative Economic Analysis of the U.S. and International Liability Schemes, 33 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 219, 240 (2008) (providing a detailed description of the
Price-Anderson Act).
144 42 U.S.C. § 2014(w) (2005).
145 Faure & Borre, supra note 143, at 242.
146 Id.
147 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh).
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provides otherwise.148 The NRC has issued regulations defining an
ENO based on criteria regarding radiation dose received,
contamination levels for certain isotopes, and monetary damages.149
The Price-Anderson Act allows the NRC to issue regulations
requiring nuclear operators to waive certain tort law defenses to
liability, de facto imposing strict liability. 150 The NRC has issued
regulations which apply this provision through the contractual terms
of the indemnity agreements which nuclear operators are required to
conclude with the NRC. 151 The indemnity agreement requires
licensees to waive:
(1) Any issue or defense as to the conduct of the
claimant or the fault of the insureds, including but not
limited to:
(i) Negligence,
(ii) Contributory negligence,
(iii) Assumption of risk, and
(iv) Unforeseeable intervening causes, whether
involving the conduct of a third person, or an act
of God,
(2) Any issue or defense as to charitable or
governmental immunity, and
(3) Any issue or defense based on any statute of
limitations if suit is instituted within three (3) years
from the date on which the claimant first knew, or
reasonably could have known, of his bodily injury or
property damage and the cause thereof, but in no event

148
Ken Lerner & Edward Tanzman, Making Victims Whole: Compensation of Nuclear
Incident Victims in Japan and the United States, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 543, 562
(2014).
149 10 C.F.R. §§ 140.84, 140.85 (2002).
150 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (n). See also Faure & Borre, supra note 143, at 241–42.
151 10 C.F.R. 140.91 (2016).
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more than twenty (20) years after the date of the
nuclear incident.152
If the NRC does not declare an accident to be an ENO then
claims are brought as normal under state law. The NRC did not
declare the Three Mile Island accident to have been an ENO and
claimants needed to prove a breach of duty, but subsequently most
states have imposed strict liability by statute.153
The Price-Anderson Act requires nuclear operators to “have
and maintain financial protection of such type and in such amounts”
as the NRC requires, currently $375 million for reactors licensed to
produce 100,000 kilowatts or more. 154 Nuclear operators are also
required to maintain secondary financial protection in the form of an
industry retrospective rating plan in the event public liability from a
single accident exceeds the primary coverage of the operator
involved.155 The amount of this secondary coverage is a maximum
of $95 million dollars per accident (adjusted for inflation), plus an
additional 5% to cover legal costs. 156 The maximum amount of
retroactive premium that can be assessed for a single accident is
currently $121.255 million.157 At present there are 104 reactors in
the pool, so there is the potential for a pool of about $12.61 billion
per incident, which combined with the insurance policy of the
operator creates a total pool of $ 12.985 billion. 158 However, no
operator will be required to pay more than an inflation adjusted $15
million per year (currently $18.963 million). 159 If the amount of
claims in a given year exceeds the pool of funds available to pay such
claims, the NRC will obtain funds from Congress or the Treasury to
advance the amount of payable claims and later recover the amounts
from the nuclear operators.160

152

Id.
Lerner & Tanzman, supra note 148, at 562–63.
154 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006); 10 C.F.R. 140.11(a)(4) (2016).
155 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b)(1).
156 42 U.S.C. §§ 2210(b)(1), (o)(1)(E).
157
10 C.F.R. 140.11(a)(4).
158 See Backgrounder on Nuclear Insurance and Disaster Relief, U.S. NUCLEAR REG.
COMM’N (December 12, 2014), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/
nuclear-insurance.html [https://perma.cc/2693-2DKT].
159 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b)(1); 10 C.F.R. 140.11(a)(4).
160 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b)(4).
153
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If damages from a single accident exceed the two tiers of
coverage then Congress shall review reports on the damages prepared
by the by Secretary of Energy or the NRC and proposals for
compensation plans prepared and submitted by the President and
“take whatever action is determined to be necessary (including
approval of appropriate compensation plans and appropriation of
funds) to provide full and prompt compensation to the public for all
public liability claims resulting from a disaster of such magnitude.”161
While the provisions regarding the Executive Branch are binding, any
action by Congress is totally discretionary.162
The CSC was implemented with the Energy Independence
and Security Act of 2007.163 No major changes were required to the
Price-Anderson Act in order to implement the CSC. The first tier of
compensation required under the CSC is addressed by nuclear
operator private insurance. For incidents not covered by the PriceAnderson Act, U.S. suppliers of nuclear technology would be
required to bear the costs of any contribution to the fund because they
“stand to benefit from the adoption of harmonized liability rules
under the CSC.” 164 Funds normally available under the PriceAnderson Act for incidents within its scope will be used to cover the
costs of participating in the CSC system and nuclear suppliers will be
required to cover the costs payable by the United States on account
of being a party to the CSC for covered incidents outside the United
States that are not within the scope of the Price-Anderson Act.165
Funds made available to the United States under the CSC will be
“used to satisfy public liability resulting from the Price-Anderson
incident.” 166 The amount of public liability allowable will be
increased by the amount of funds made available by the CSC
international supplementary fund.167 Where suppliers are responsible
for covering contributions to the international supplementary fund
created under the CSC, the amount of the contribution will be
assigned to individual suppliers based on a risk-informed assessment

161
162
163
164
165
166
167

42 U.S.C. § 2210(e), (i).
Lerner & Tanzman, supra note 148, at 565.
42 U.S.C. § 17001 (2007).
S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 109-15, supra note 3, at 7.
42 U.S.C. § 17373(c), (e) (2007).
42 U.S.C. § 17373(d)(1).
42 U.S.C. § 17373(d)(2).
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formula.168 The U.S. Treasury will pay the amount of contribution
required for the international supplementary fund and will collect
reimbursement from nuclear suppliers.169

IV.

JAPANESE NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION
SYSTEM

In Japan civil liability for nuclear damage is governed under
the 1963 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage (ACND).170 The
ACND states that its purpose is “to protect persons suffering from
nuclear damage and to contribute to the sound development of the
nuclear industry.”171 The ACND defines nuclear damage to mean
“any damage caused by the effects of the fission process of nuclear
fuel, or of the radiation from nuclear fuel etc., or of the toxic nature
of such materials.”172 The compensation system established by the
Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage is the exclusive remedy
for nuclear damage,173 and the nuclear operator is solely liable for
nuclear damage.174 Unlike in other systems, no limit is placed on the
liability of nuclear operators.175 Strict liability for nuclear damage is
imposed on nuclear operators except where the damage is caused by
a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character or by an
insurrection. 176 Where the damage is caused by a grave natural
disaster of an exceptional character or by an insurrection the
Government of Japan “shall take the necessary measures to relieve
victims and to prevent the damage from spreading.” 177 Nuclear
operators retain a right of recourse against a third party that where the
nuclear operator has provided compensation for nuclear damage
caused by the willful act of that third party.178

168

42 U.S.C. § 17373(e)(1)(C).
42 U.S.C. § 17373(h)(1).
170 ACND, supra note 10.
171 ACND, supra note 10, art. 1
172 ACND, supra note 10, art. 2, para. 2.
173 ACND, supra note 10, art. 4.
174 ACND, supra note 10, art. 4, para. 1.
175
ACND, supra note 10, art. 3–4; Eri Osaka, The Future of Nuclear Power in East
Asia: Corporate Liability, Government Liability, and the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, 21
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 433, 453 (2012).
176 ACND, supra note 10, art. 3, para. 1.
177 ACND, supra note 10, art. 17.
178 ACND, supra note 10, art. 5, para. 1.
169
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As there are no provisions altering the normal law on statutes
of limitations in the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage
plaintiffs are required to bring claims within three years of knowledge
of the harm and the identity of the tortfeasor, but not later than twenty
years from the date of the harm.179 This has been extended for toxic
torts, however, such that victims simply must bring their claim within
the three year period of prescription described above.180
A nuclear operator must provide ¥ 120 billion of financial
security either (a) by maintain a private insurance policy and an
indemnity agreement for compensation of certain nuclear damage
with the Government of Japan, (b) by providing a deposit of that
amount, or (c) by other sufficient financial security approved by the
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology
(MEXT).181 Under the ACND the Government is required to provide
such aid as is required for a nuclear operator to provide compensation
for nuclear damage to the extent authorized to do so by the National
Diet when the amount of compensation due for nuclear damage
exceeds the financial security amount and when the Government
“deems it necessary in order to attain the objectives of this Act.”182
Liability insurance contracts for nuclear damage indemnify a nuclear
operator for most loss arising from compensating nuclear damage.183
Indemnity agreements for nuclear damage are agreements in which
the Government of Japan indemnifies a nuclear operator for loss
arising from compensating nuclear damage not covered by the
liability insurance contract or other financial security for
compensation of nuclear damage, such as damages due to normal
operations, volcanos and earthquakes, and damages otherwise
covered by private insurance but not claimed within ten years of the
nuclear accident.184
Minpō (≁⌅) [Civ. C.], Law No. 89 of 1896, art. 724 (Japan); Osaka, supra note
175, at 449.
180 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Apr. 27, 2004, Hei 13 (uke) no. 1760, 58(4) Saikō
Saibansho Minji Hanreishū [Minshū] 1032 (Japan); See also Osaka, supra note 175, at 449.
181 ACND, supra note 10, art. 7, para. 1.
182 ACND, supra note 10, art. 16.
183
ACND, supra note 10, art. 8.
184 ACND, supra note 10, art. 10; Genshiryoku Songai Baishō Hoshō Keiyaku ni
kansuru Hōritsu (  ᆀ  ᨽ ᇣ 䌐  ݏ㼌  ཱྀ ݏ㌴ Ȁ 䯒 Ǯ Ƞ ⌅ ᖻ ) [Act on Indemnity
Agreements for the Compensation of Nuclear Damage], Law No. 148 of 1961, art. 2 (Japan),
http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S36/S36HO148.html
[https://perma.cc/E32C-MFHT]
[hereinafter Indemnity Agreements Act].
179
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In response to the multi-trillion yen damages caused by the
Fukushima Daiichi incident, Japan passed the Nuclear Damage
Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation Act in
2011.185 The Act created a fund to provide aid to TEPCO, and other
future nuclear operations that have liability for nuclear damage
exceeding the amount of financial security required of them, so that
it would be able to pay out all compensation for which it was liable
rather than face liquidation due to the large amount of claims for
nuclear damage. 186 The shareholders of the corporation are the
Government of Japan and other non-governmental persons, including
nuclear operators, though nuclear operators are not required to
become shareholders.187 The current shareholders of the Corporation
include the Government of Japan, which invested ¥ 7 billion, and
nuclear operators including TEPCO, which also invested ¥ 7
billion. 188 Under the Compensation Corporation Act nuclear
operators pay annual premiums and will be able to request funds to
pay compensation claims without any obligation to repay the
Compensation Corporation.189 The Compensation Corporation may
also provide additional assistance to nuclear operators, such as
loans.190 Also, the Government is authorized to issue interest-free,
non-transferable bonds to the corporation which can be redeemed to
ensure availability of funds to provide financial assistance to a
nuclear operator in the event of an accident that causes damages so
large the Corporation does not have sufficient funds to provide aid to
a nuclear operator. 191 A nuclear operator receiving financial
assistance in this manner will be required to pay an additional
contribution on top of its normal annual contribution. 192 Where a
ACND, supra note 10, art. 16; Genshiryoku Songai Baishō Hairo Tō Shien Kikō Hō
(  ᆀ  ᨽ ᇣ 䌐  ࣭ ݏᓳ ⚹ ㅹ ᭟ ᨤ  Ώ ⌅ [Nuclear Damage Compensation and
Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation Act] Law No. 94 of 2011, art. 2 (Japan),
http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/H23/H23HO094.html
[https://perma.cc/VN87-PTKN]
[hereinafter Compensation Corporation Act]; see also Osaka, supra note 175, at 442.
186 Osaka, supra note 175, at 442.
187 Compensation Corporation Act, supra note 185, art. 4.
188 Kikō no Gaiyō (Ώȃᾲ㾱) [Summary of [the] Structure [of the Nuclear Damage
Compensation and Facilitation Corporation], NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION AND
FACILITATION CORPORATION, http://www.ndf.go.jp/soshiki/kikou_gaiyou.html [https://
perma.cc/2KL8-DBSH] (last visited Jan. 15, 2017).
189 Compensation Corporation Act, supra note 185, art. 38, 39, 41.
190 Compensation Corporation Act, supra note 185, art. 41.
191 Compensation Corporation Act, supra note 185, art. 45, 48–49.
192 Compensation Corporation Act, supra note 185, art. 52.
185
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corporation receives aid in this manner it must prepare a “special
business plan” jointly with the Corporation, which includes measures
for rationalization of the nuclear operator’s operations.193
Two laws were passed in 2014 in order to implement changes
to Japanese law required for ratification of the CSC, the Act on
Assistance, etc., for the Nuclear Damage Compensation Fund
pursuant to the Implementation of the Convention on Supplementary
Compensation for Nuclear Damage and the Act Amending Certain
Provisions of the Act on Compensation of Nuclear Damage and the
Act on Indemnity Agreements for the Compensation of Nuclear
Damage.194
Under the CSC Assistance Act, the Government will provide
financial assistance to a nuclear operator where the amount of nuclear
damages suffered in the territory of a party to the CSC or suffered by
a national of a party to the CSC is above 300 million SDR when
jurisdiction over the claim lies with the courts of Japan. 195 The
amount of aid is the lesser of the amount of compensation payable by
a nuclear operator under the CSC in excess of 300 million SDR and
the amount payable by Japan as its contribution to the international
supplementary compensation fund, plus interest and costs. 196 The
Government collects regular annual deposits of ¥170,400,000 from
193

Compensation Corporation Act, supra note 185, art. 45.
Genshiryoku Songai no Hokantekina Hoshō ni kansuru Jōyaku no Jisshi ni tomonau
Genshiryoku Songai Baishō Shikin no Hojo Tō ni kansuru Hōritsu (ᆀᨽᇣȃ㼌ᆼⲴ
ǿ㼌ݏȀ䯒ǮȠᶑ㌴ȃᇏᯭȀդǛᆀᨽᇣ䌐ݏ䋷䠁ȃ㼌ࣙㅹȀ䯒ǮȠ⌅ᖻ) [Act
on Assistance, etc., for the Nuclear Damage Compensation Fund pursuant to the
Implementation of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage],
Law No. 133 of 2014 (Japan) [hereinafter CSC Assistance Act]; Genshiryoku Songai no
Baishō ni kansuru Hōritsu oyobi Genshiryoku Songai Baishō Hoshō Keiyaku ni kansuru
Hōritsu no Ichibu wo Kaisei suru Hōritsu (ᆀᨽᇣȃ䌐ݏȀ䯒ǮȠ⌅ᖻ৺Ȉᆀ
ᨽᇣ䌐ݏ㼌ཱྀݏ㌴Ȁ䯒ǮȠ⌅ᖻȃа䜘ȧ᭩↓ǮȠ⌅ᖻ ([Act Amending Certain
Provisions of the Act on Compensation of Nuclear Damage and the Act on Indemnity
Agreements for the Compensation of Nuclear Damage], Law No. 134 of 2014 (Japan),
http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_housei.nsf/html/housei/18720141128134.htm
[https://perma.cc/JMY9-R2J2] [hereinafter CSC Amendments Act].
195 CSC Assistance Act, supra note 194, art. 3; Genshiryoku Songai no Hokantekina
Hoshō ni kansuru Jōyaku no Jisshi ni tomonau Gensiryoku Songai Baishō Shikin no Hojo
Tō ni kansuru Hōritsu Shikōrei (ᆀᨽᇣȃ㼌ᆼⲴǿ㼌ݏȀ䯒ǮȠᶑ㌴ȃᇏᯭȀդ
Ǜᆀᨽᇣ䌐ݏ䋷䠁ȃ㼌ࣙㅹȀ䯒ǮȠ⌅ᖻᯭ㹼Ԕ) [Cabinet Order Implementing
the Act on Assistance, etc., for the Nuclear Damage Compensation Fund pursuant to the
Implementation of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage],
Cabinet Order No. 173 of 2015 (Japan), http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/H27/H27SE173.
html [https://perma.cc/33CG-JZUA] [hereinafter CSC Assistance Act Cabinet Order].
196 CSC Assistance Act Cabinet Order, supra note 195, art. 2.
194
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nuclear operators for the purpose of satisfying any obligation under
the CSC to make a contribution to the international supplementary
fund.197 The Government will also collect a special deposit from a
nuclear operator equal to the amount required as a contribution to the
international supplementary compensation fund by Japan.198
The changes to Japanese law under the CSC Amendments Act
to bring Japanese law with the Annex of the CSC were minimal as
Japanese law largely was largely already in conformance. The most
significant change is that after the amendment operators have a right
of recourse only when nuclear damage was caused by the willful act
of a natural person, not any third party as under previous law, or
where there is express provision for a right of recourse in a written
agreement.199

V.

ANALYSIS OF THE CSC’S PROVISIONS

Having previously noted how low membership in the CSC
limits its utility, this section will analyze how well the provisions of
the CSC accomplish their objectives of ensuring adequate victim
compensation while shielding nuclear operators from unsustainable
levels of potential liability, in particular regarding the largest users of
nuclear power in the CSC, the United States and Japan. As described
above, the CSC follows prior practice in the Paris and Vienna
Conventions of applying strict and exclusive liability for nuclear
operators, employing these same core mechanisms to shield the
nuclear industry as a whole from liability and concentrating it on the
nuclear operator. The CSC was formulated to address criticisms of
the original Paris and Vienna Conventions regarding low liability
limits, the lack of a supplementary compensation fund, short statutes
of limitations, overly restrictive types of covered damages, and
limited territorial scope.200 The CSC is the implementation of the
need for a supplementary compensation fund. This section will
examine several critiques of the CSC involving: definition of
damages, limitations on liability, legal channeling, statutes of
197
CSC Assistance Act, supra note 194, art. 4; CSC Assistance Act Cabinet Order,
supra note 195, art. 3.
198 CSC Assistance Act, supra note 194, art. 10, 11; CSC Assistance Act Cabinet Order,
supra note 195, art. 5.
199 CSC Amendments Act, supra note 194, art. 1.
200 Currie, supra note 4, at 107.
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limitations, and jurisdiction over claims. This paper argues that the
CSC will likely prove to have little impact on domestic victims in
either the United States or Japan because it does not substantially
increase the amount of compensation available or make
compensation particularly easier to obtain. The CSC would, however,
improve the availability of compensation in many nations
considering nuclear power that currently heavily limit industry
liability.
A. Definition of Damages
Under the original Paris and Vienna Conventions nuclear
damages were restricted to loss of life, personal injury and damage to
property. 201 The Revised Vienna Convention and the CSC greatly
expanded the definition of nuclear damages to include a variety of
economic and environmental damages to the extent allowed by the
law of the competent court as described above. 202 Despite this
expanded definition, critics of the CSC and the other Conventions
attack the definition of damages for being overly restrictive, and, in
the case of Japan, are concerned that ratification of the CSC will
eliminate several types of damage currently included in compensable
damages.203
As Japanese law currently allows all damages proved to be
caused by a nuclear accident, the more restrictive CSC definition does
somewhat limit compensable damages.204 The Japan Federation of
Bar Associations is specifically concerned that the CSC definition
does not explicitly include emotional damages or damages from
harmful rumors.205 While the CSC definition does not specifically
include rumor damages, scholarly consensus is that both of these
types of damage will still be included in cases subject to Japanese law.
Japanese jurisprudence allows for the compensation of pure
economic damages without any harm to person or property, such as
so called rumor damages, “where the desire of a consumer or business
partner to avoid [doing business with the plaintiff] out of concern for
the danger of contamination by radioactive substances on account of
201
202
203
204
205

Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 1; Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 1(j).
CSC, supra note 1, art. 1(f)(iii–vii).
Currie, supra note 4, at 85; August 2014 JFBA opinion, at 1.
ACND, supra note 10, art. 3.
August 2014 JFBA opinion, supra note 4, at 4.
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the present accident is deemed reasonable by the standard of an
average or regular person.” 206 The CSC definition of nuclear
damages leaves room for claims brought under Japanese law to
include rumor damages in the scope of compensable damages in
under art. I(f)(vii) (“any other economic loss, other than any caused
by the impairment of the environment, if permitted by the general law
on civil liability of the competent court”).207
Regarding emotional harms, the fact that the CSC includes
personal injury in the definition of nuclear damage while the other
conventions on the compensation of nuclear damage refer to bodily
injury could be interpreted to mean that the more expansive term
personal injury is intended to include both purely physical harms and
emotional harms.208
In addition, some argue that damages should be further
expanded to include rumor damages even where no measurable
radioactivity has been released,209 and fully integrate economic and
environmental damages regardless of the law of the competent
court. 210 Others criticize the CSC definition for being too broad,
saying that including pure economic damages in the scope of nuclear
damages makes it harder for victims that suffered personal injury or
property damage to recover the full amount of recoverable damages
unless the financial resources of the nuclear operator are unlimited.211
206 Otsuka Tadashi (བྷຊⴤ), Fukushima Dai’ichi Genshiryoku Hatsudensho Jiko ni
yoru Songai Baishō (⾿ጦㅜаᆀⲪ䴫ᡰһ᭵ȀȝȠᨽᇣ䌐[ )ݏCompensation for
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants Accident], in Shinsai ࣭ Genpatsu Jiko to
Kankyō Hō ( 䴷 ⚭ ࣭  Ⲫ һ ᭵ ǽ ⫠ ຳ ⌅ ) [EARTHQUAKES, NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW] 79 (Shigeru Takahashi & Tadashi Otsuka eds. 2013) (citing NAGOYA
KōTō SAIBANSHO KANAZAWA SHIBU [NAGOYA HIGH CT. KANAZAWA BRANCH] May 17, 1989,
1322 HANREI JIHŌ (ࡔֻᱲ) 99).
207
NIHON ENERUGĪ-HŌ KENKYŪJO (ᰕᵜȰɕɳȶό⌅⹄ウᡰ) [JAPAN ENERGY LAW
INSTITUTE], GENSHIRYOKU SONGAI NO HOKANTEKI HOSHŌ NI KANSURU JŌYAKU KAKU JŌ NO
KAISETSU OYOBI HŌTEKI MONDAITEN NO KENTŌ (ᆀᨽᇣȃ㼌ᆼⲴ㼌ݏȀ䯒ǮȠᶑ㌴
 ᶑ ȃ 䀓 䃜 ৺ Ȉ ⌅ Ⲵ  乼 ⛩ ȃ Ὄ 䀾 ) [EXPLANATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE
CONVENTION ON SUPPLEMENTARY COMPENSATION OF NUCLEAR DAMAGE AND STUDY OF
LEGAL ISSUES], no. 126, at 14 (2012), http://www.jeli.gr.jp/report/jeli-R-126@2012_11_
CSC.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3KC-97F5] [hereinafter JELI no. 126].
208 Id. at 5.
209 Jon M. Van Dyke, Liability and Compensation for Harm Caused by Nuclear
Activities, 35 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 13, 36 (2006).
210 Currie, supra note 4, at 86.
211 Niimi Ikufumi (ᯠ㖾㛢᮷), Genpatsu Jiko to Songai Baishō Hō (Ⲫһ᭵ǽᨽᇣ
䌐[ )⌅ݏNuclear Accidents and Compensation Law], in SHINSAI ࣭GENPATSU JIKO TO
KANKYŌ HŌ ( 䴷 ⚭ ࣭  Ⲫ һ ᭵ ǽ ⫠ ຳ ⌅ ) [EARTHQUAKES, NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW] 142–43 (Shigeru Takahashi & Tadashi Otsuka eds. 2013).
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In summary, the definition of damages of the CSC and the
Revised Vienna Convention is much more protective of victims than
the definition currently used in the un-amended Paris Convention,
though the range of compensable damages could be further expanded,
and concerns about reduced coverage in Japan are largely unfounded.
B. Limitations on Liability
Limits on liability have been put in place to prevent nuclear
operators from shouldering the full cost of insuring their liabilities
and inability to compensate any damages due to bankruptcy. 212
These limitations on the liability of nuclear operators have a
distorting effect because they allow nuclear operators to avoid fully
internalizing the costs of their operations. 213 Nevertheless, it is
unlikely that international agreements can raise the minimum limits
on the amount of compensation to a level that would ensure full
compensation of the largest nuclear accidents and that this can be
addressed mainly through national law. While the 1990s era
Conventions with minimum liability amounts of 300 million SDR
would be sufficient to cover an accident the size of the Three Mile
Island accident with damages of $70 million,214 the Conventions have
been roundly criticized for adopting minimum compensation
amounts that are substantially lower than would be required to
actually compensate a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl or
Fukushima. 215 The World Health Organization estimates the
damages from Chernobyl will be in the range of hundreds of billions
of dollars, though notes that the amount is not possible to accurately
calculate.216 Damages from Fukushima have already exceeded ¥ 4
trillion.217

212

Currie, supra note 4, at 91.
Faure & Borre, supra note 143, at 264.
214 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-654, NRC’S LIABILITY INSURANCE
REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS OWNED BY LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 5
(2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04654.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9QQ-2QDE].
215
Van Dyke, supra note 209, at 35 (describing the current limits on damages “grossly
inadequate”); August 2014 JFBA Opinion, supra note 4, at 4–5.
216 Chernobyl: The True Scale of the Accident, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Sep. 5, 2005),
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2005/pr38/en/
[https://perma.cc/3QQNN2YR].
217 House of Councilors Report, supra note 3, at 52.
213
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Limitations on the monetary amount of damages and the
plaintiffs who are allowed to bring claims have increased from the
Paris Convention’s upper limit of $15 million to a first tier of at least
300 million SDR and a second tier of up to 300 million SDR in the
CSC and Revised Vienna Convention. 218 However, this is still
considerably lower than the $12.9 billion available in the United
States. 219 Japan has an unlimited liability system, but even the
primary insurance requirement of ¥ 120 billion is considerably higher
than the CSC minimum amount.220 Above that amount compensation
is addressed through direct government aid or through the
Compensation Corporation in the form of payouts and loans.221 The
Revised Paris Convention proposed to increase the minimum limit on
liability to € 700 million, and combined with the Revised Brussels
Supplementary Convention the total amount of available funds would
have been € 1.5 billion, but there is no sign that this will be ratified at
any point.222
Industry groups are very much in favor of limited liability,
and in Japan are pushing for a change from unlimited to limited
liability, saying that industry and the public should share the risks of
nuclear power and that unlimited liability will prevent full
compensation of damages.223 However limitations on liability should
only be necessary if nuclear operators are poorly capitalized and are
unable to shoulder the increase in insurance costs under an unlimited
liability system.224 Furthermore this punishes the victims of nuclear
accidents not the party that caused the accident.225 Indeed, the trend
218

Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 7; Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 5;
CSC, supra note 1, art. 3.
219 Backgrounder on Nuclear Insurance and Disaster Relief, NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N
(Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/nuclearinsurance.html [https://perma.cc/WE4Y-H63H].
220 ACND, supra note 10, art. 7, para. 1.
221 ACND, supra note 10, art. 16; Compensation Corporation Act arts. 38, 39, 41, 45,
48–49
222 2004 Protocol to Amend Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 1(H); 2004 Protocol
to Amend Brussels Supplementary Convention, supra note 38, art. 3.
223 SAWA AKIHIRO & TAKEUCHI SUMIKO (◔ᱝ㼅 & ㄩ㍄ᆀ), 21 SEIKI SEISAKU
KENKYŪJO (21 ц ㌰ ᭯ ㆆ ⹄ ウ ᡰ ) [THE 21ST CENTURY PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE],
GENSHIRYOKU JIGYŌ KANKYŌ TAISEI SEIBI NI MUKETE (ᆀһᾝ⫠ຳ࣭փࡦᮤۉȀੁ
Ǧ ǻ ) [TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION FOR NUCLEAR POLICY AND BUSINESS
CHALLENGES] 37 (2013), http://www.21ppi.org/pdf/thesis/131114_02.pdf [https://perma.cc/
FV8A-QMS8].
224 Currie, supra note 4, at 91.
225 Id.
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has been for states to move away from limited liability, beginning
with Germany in 1985.226 However at the urging of industry groups,
Japan is considering moving the opposite direction to transition from
unlimited liability to either a limited liability system or imposing a
statutory cap on liability above which the government will provide
compensation as a reaction to the massive costs imposed by the
Fukushima accident.227 One interesting proposal is to add a second
layer of coverage based on the Price-Anderson model of retroactive
premiums, but making the amount of the fund scalable up to ¥ 3
trillion to ¥ 4 trillion above which the government would be
responsible for providing compensation.228 Critics of Japan’s current
system, such as Prof. Urakawa, note that unlike other unlimited
liability systems, Japan does not have clear rules on when
government assistance will be provided, impeding risk
management. 229 He notes that the current system based on the
Compensation Corporation creates a never ending compensation
process that holds back the recovery of both victims and TEPCO and
other members of the nuclear industry.230
While the CSC’s minimum liability amounts are lower than
those in the United States and Japan, other Asian countries at present
limit liability to less than the CSC minimum amount. For example,
China, which Japan has encouraged to join the CSC,231 only provides
800 million RMB of coverage, though additional indemnity may be
provided for an extraordinary nuclear accident. 232 Adoption of the
226 Currently Austria, Germany, Japan and Switzerland apply unlimited liability.
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 59.
227
SAWA & TAKEUCHI, supra note 223, at 37.
228 SAWA & TAKEUCHI, supra note 223, at 34.
229
Urakawa Michitarō (⎖ᐍ䚃ཚ䛾), Genbaihō no Mukashitsu Songai Baishō Seido to
Genpatsu Higaisha Kyūsai no Arikata (䌐⌅ȃ❑䙾ཡᨽᇣ䌐ࡦݏᓖǽⲪ㻛ᇣ㘵ᮁ
ȃ ൘ ȟ ᯩ ) [The Act on Compensation of Nuclear Damage Strict Liability Damage
Compensation System and the Future of Assistance to Victims of Nuclear Damage], in 21
SEIKI SEISAKU KENKYŪJO (21 ц ㌰ ᭯ ㆆ ⹄ ウ ᡰ ) [THE 21ST CENTURY PUBLIC POLICY
INSTITUTE], ARATANA GENSHIRYOKU SONGAI BAISHŌ SEIDO NI MUKETE (ᯠǴǿᆀᨽ
ᇣ䌐ࡦݏᓖȃΏㇹȀੁǦǻ) [TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW COMPENSATION
SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGES] 157 (Sawa Akihiro ed. 2013), http://www.21ppi.org/pdf/
thesis/131114_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7EH-W9A5].
230
Id. at 160.
231 House of Councilors Report, supra note 3, at 52–53.
232 Guowuyuan ( ഭ  䲒 ) [State Council of the People’s Republic of China],
Guowuyuan Guanyu Chuli Disanfang He Zeren Wenti Gei He Gongye Bu, Guojia He
Anquan Ju, Guowuyuan Hedian Lingdao Xiaozu de Pifu (ഭ䲒ޣҾ༴⨶ㅜйᯩṨ䍓ԫ
䰞仈㔉Ṩᐕъ䜘ǃഭᇦṨᆹޘተǃഭ䲒Ṩ⭥亶ሬሿ㓴Ⲵᢩ༽) [Reply of the Council
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CSC would require increases in the amount of damages nuclear
operators are liable for and would in that sense increase the amount
of compensation available to potential victims.
Furthermore, the CSC provides for two exceptions to liability
for nuclear operators: for nuclear damage directly due to an act of
armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection and for damage
directly due to a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character,
except where the law of the installation state provides otherwise.233
The exception for grave natural disasters of an exceptional character
has been removed from the Revised Paris and Vienna Conventions.234
This provision obstructs victim compensation for what could be the
most damaging nuclear accidents to the extent the government does
not provide compensation in place of the nuclear operator.235 In the
United States, the Price-Anderson Act specifically requires nuclear
operators to waive force majeure defenses to liability. 236 Japan
however grants an exception to liability for grave natural disasters of
an exceptional character.237 However, the bar for how uncommon the
disaster must is quite high, with the standard being something in the
range of completely unimaginable. 238 This rather restricts the
applicability of this provision, and even the 2011 Great East Japan
Earthquake was determined to not meet this standard.239
Despite the disadvantages of limited liability, international
agreements are not likely to be a successful method of addressing the
issue. Potential state parties are simply unlikely to be willing to
change their policy through international dialogue. Progress has been
to the Ministry of Nuclear Industry, National Nuclear Safety Bureau and the State Council
Atomic Energy Board in respect of Resolving Third Parties’ Nuclear Liability] (1986)
(China), http://wap.cnki.net/qikan-GWYB198609002.html [https://perma.cc/FJ7N-N5GT];
Guowuyuan (ഭ䲒) [State Council of the People’s Republic of China], Guowuyuan
Guanyu He Shigu Sunhai Peichang Zeren Wenti de Pifu (ഭ䲒ޣҾṨһ᭵ᦏᇣ䎄گ䍓
ԫ䰞仈Ⲵᢩ༽) [Official Reply of the State Council to Questions on the Liabilities of
Compensation for Damages Resulting From Nuclear Accidents] (2007) (China),
http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/nlb/nlb-80/documents/103_104_TextChina.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/R27N-KL87]; Jing Liu & Michael Faure, Compensating Nuclear Damage in
China, 11 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 781, 808 (2012).
233 CSC, supra note 1, Annex art. 3(5).
234 1997 Revised Vienna Protocol, supra note 38, art. 6; 2004 Protocol to Amend Paris
Convention, supra note 38, art. 1(J).
235 Currie, supra note 4, at 87.
236 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (n); 10 C.F.R. 140.91.
237 ACND, supra note 10, art. 3, para. 1.
238 Otsuka, supra note 206, at 69.
239 Id.
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seen is in the removal of the exception for grave natural disasters of
an exceptional character and the CSC has a substantially greater
minimum liability amount, but the Revised Vienna Convention was
only ratified by 13 of the 40 Vienna Convention parties. 240 The
purpose of international agreements on liability for nuclear damages
is to coordinate jurisdiction and ensure coverage of transnational
damages.241 While in regions like Europe with many small countries
closely packed together there is a greater risk of transboundary
damages, victims in the United States or Japan are far more likely to
be injured in purely domestic accidents. For them, limits on liability
are above all a matter for domestic discussion. Furthermore, Japan
has managed to provide compensation far beyond the amount of
financial security required of nuclear operators through the
innovative, if perhaps clunky, system of the Compensation
Corporation. The effects of nuclear damages are primarily felt in
relatively close proximity to the site of the accident. Pressure to
ensure adequate compensation should therefore be strongest
domestically.
C. Legal Channeling
Further innovations should be expected at the level of
domestic law. While legal channeling is the norm internationally, it
is not an efficient way of compensating victims. Legal channeling is
yet another way in which the nuclear industry, in particular
manufacturers, shields itself from liability and avoids economically
efficient internalization of costs.242 While legal channeling decreases
the administrative costs of concurrent lawsuits, it does not outweigh
the benefits to efficiency of allowing a victim to sue all possible
parties for a given harm.243 The economic channeling used in the
United States is more efficient because it reduces administrative costs
by requiring operators to include all possible third parties into the
operator’s coverage while still allowing victims to choose from the
full range of possible defendants.244 The United States long rejected
joining any Convention which would have required it to abandon
240
241
242
243
244

Vienna Convention Latest Status, supra note 17.
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 41.
Faure & Borre, supra note 143, at 464.
Id. at 465.
Id.
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economic channeling.245 The CSC is therefore the better option for
the United States as compared to the Paris Convention or Vienna
Convention, which would have required the United States to adopt
economic channeling.
Unfortunately, this exception to the
requirement of implementing legal channeling is part of the CSC’s
provisions exempting the United States from certain requirements
with which national legislation must conform. 246 This does little
good for other parties to the CSC.
D. Statute of Limitations
Another criticism of the CSC is that its statute of limitations
is too short for the radiological harms caused by nuclear damage and
that time limits on the bringing of claims should be eliminated
entirely. 247 The CSC requires that states implement law requiring
claims be brought within three years of knowledge of the harm and
identity of the tortfeasor but not longer than 10 years, however if
under national law the liability of the operator is covered by insurance
or other financial security for a longer period, then the statute of
limitations can be extended correspondingly.248 This is shorter than
provided for under U.S. law (20 years) or Japanese law (20 years by
statute, but courts have extended this as noted above). 249 For
comparison, the Revised Paris and Vienna Conventions extend their
statute of limitations all the way to 30 years.250 While the statute of
limitations in the CSC is shorter than is provided for under U.S. or
Japanese law, this provision will have no effect on the United States
or Japan because the financial security requirements cover longer
periods.

245

1999 DOE Report, supra note 19, at 25.
CSC, supra note 1, Annex art. 2.
247 August 2014 JFBA opinion, supra note 4, at 5; Van Dyke, supra note 209, at 36.
248
CSC, supra note 1, Annex art. 9.
249 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (n); 10 C.F.R. 140.91; Minpō (≁⌅) [Civ. C.], Law No. 89 of 1896,
art. 724 (Japan); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Apr. 27, 2004, Hei 13 (uke) no. 1760, 58(4)
Saikō Saibansho Minji Hanreishū [Minshū] 1032 (Japan).
250 1997 Revised Vienna Protocol, supra note 52, art. 8; 2004 Protocol to Amend Paris
Convention, supra note 38, art. 1(I).
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E. Jurisdiction over Claims
Another major criticism of the CSC and the other
Conventions is that they provide for exclusive jurisdiction over
claims in the courts of the country in which they occurred. 251
Criticism of this provision focuses on two matters. First, some, such
as the JFBA, see this as disadvantaging victims in countries such as
Japan that would need to pursue claims in distant countries which
may have only the minimum provisions required under the CSC.252
In advanced countries, such as the United States and Japan, legal
protections are substantially stronger than the minimum provisions
required by international treaty. The situation in developing
countries is rather different as illustrated in the discussion of
limitations on damages.
Second some, such as Prof. Currie, criticize the lack of neutral
tribunals. 253
The CSC and other agreements require that
compensation be provided without discrimination on the basis of
nationality, domicile or residence.254 Prof. Currie is concerned about
forcing victims to sue in a court of a state economically linked to its
own nuclear industry.255 He further argues for the application of the
law of the place in which the damage occurred, not where the accident
took place, because it is clear that there is a risk of damage in distant
locations and victims are justified in relying on the safety standards
of their own country.256
On the other hand, it can also be noted, perhaps rather
cynically, that from the perspective of a country like Japan which is
more likely to be the location of an accident than a victim of
transnational damage from a neighbor,257 it may be beneficial to be
251

CSC, supra note 1, art. 13(1).
August 2014 JFBA opinion, supra note 4, at 5.
253 Currie, supra note 4, at 85.
254 CSC, supra note 1, art. 3(2)(a).
255 Currie, supra note 4, at 95.
256 Id. at 97.
257 Takeuchi Sumiko ( ㄩ  ㍄ ᆀ ), Wagakuni no Genshiryoku Jigyō no Rekishi to
Genshiryoku Songai Baishō Seido no Seitei Keii (ᡁǡഭȃᆀһᾝȃ↤ਢǽᆀᨽ
ᇣ䌐ࡦݏᓖȃࡦᇊ㍼㐟) [The Historical Context of Nuclear Operations and Nuclear
Damage Compensation in Japan], in 21 SEIKI SEISAKU KENKYŪJO (21 ц㌰᭯ㆆ⹄ウᡰ)
[THE 21ST CENTURY PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE], ARATANA GENSHIRYOKU SONGAI BAISHŌ
SEIDO NO KŌCHIKU NI MUKETE (ᯠǴǿᆀᨽᇣ䌐ࡦݏᓖȃΏㇹȀੁǦǻ) [TOWARD
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGES] 51 (Sawa
Akihiro ed. 2013), http://www.21ppi.org/pdf/thesis/131114_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7EH252
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protected by provisions that require that claims be brought in your
own courts.

VI.

REFORM EFFORTS

In 2012 the IAEA’s International Expert Group on Nuclear
Liability (INLEX) made recommendations on how the international
community should adjust the system for compensating nuclear
damages in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident.258 The report
strongly recommended that states with nuclear reactors ratify at least
one of the Conventions, and encouraged states with no reactors to
consider joining a Convention to receive the benefits of ensuring
compensation for transnational nuclear damage. 259 The report
specifically recommended that states with nuclear installations ensure
the availability of funds to compensate all victims of a nuclear
incident, without discrimination. Such states should: “establish
compensation and financial security amounts significantly higher
than the minimum amounts envisaged under the existing instruments,”
“undertake regular reviews of the adequacy of compensation
amounts . . . ,” “undertake regular reviews of the adequacy of
financial security amounts . . . ,” “be prepared to set up alternative
funding mechanisms where the amount of damage exceeds the
available compensation and financial security,” “provide
compensation for latent injuries, “ “ensure that compensation is
available in the case of an incident directly due to a grave natural
disaster of an exceptional character,” and “ensure that all claims from
a nuclear disaster are dealt with in a single forum in a prompt,
equitable, and non-discriminatory manner with minimal
litigation . . . .”260
These recommendations address the issues with the
provisions of the CSC raised in this paper. Monetary limits on
liability have gradually increased but are still insufficient to cover a
W9A5] (noting the concern of Japan’s neighbors about transnational damage from a nuclear
accident in Japan).
258 RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO FACILITATE ACHIEVEMENT OF A GLOBAL NUCLEAR
LIABILITY REGIME, AS REQUESTED BY THE IAEA ACTION PLAN ON NUCLEAR SAFETY, INT’L
EXPERT GROUP ON NUCLEAR LIABILITY (INLEX) (Aug. 15, 2012) [hereinafter INLEX
Recommendations], http://ola.iaea.org/ola/documents/ActionPlan.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7B3A-KYHR].
259 Id. at 3.
260 Id. at 3–4.
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large accident. Concerns remain about the advisability of allowing
national courts to adjudicate claims where the nuclear industry is a
major stakeholder in the national economy. This paper has discussed
how the international forum is not the best place to assure
compensation to all domestic victims of a nuclear accident, though it
is the only way to assure compensation to victims of nuclear damage
caused by an accident in a foreign country. We have seen that Japan
had to enact extraordinary measures to assure compensation for the
Fukushima accident because it only required ¥ 120 billion of financial
security despite the unlimited liability faced by its nuclear operators.
However, Japan successfully innovated to develop a novel method
for compensating the victims of the Fukushima accident. These
recommendations, however, show no indication that there will be any
change to the use of legal channeling.
In conclusion, in the existing treaties the protection of the
nuclear industry from liability is prioritized over ensuring adequate
victim compensation. However, the issue of civil liability for nuclear
damages, in particular transnational damages, is likely to become
more pressing. At present, there are 60 new nuclear reactors under
construction, half of which are in Asia.261 Of these, 20 are in China,
which is not party to any of the Conventions, has most of its
provisions on compensation for nuclear damage only in
administrative law, and provides for only minimal amounts of
operator liability as compared to the CSC or Revised Vienna
Convention.262 Innovation on the international stage has tended to
follow major accidents. There can be little question that there will be
future accidents. We shall see how the current framework holds up
and evolves should there be another accident like Chernobyl with
substantial transnational damages.
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